A summary of available industrial demilitarization technologies is provided

Of the above, the most influential factors have usually been the donor resources available and economies of scale. The more ammunition there is for destruction and the wider the range of available, affordable, and efficient technologies, the more likely it is that an industrial demilitarization facility can be developed. Industrial scale demilitarization has many advantages, including mechanical disassembly, incineration in environmentally controlled systems, and the ability to operate 24 hours per day and 365 days per year. Its major disadvantage is the high capital set-up costs of design, project management, construction, and commissioning. Operating costs are generally lower than OBOD (once amortization of the development capital is discounted). It must be remembered that the physical destruction process for ammunition is only one process in the complete demilitarization cycle. This operational cycle is complex, comprehensive, wide-ranging, and includes activities such as transportation and storage, processing operations, equipment maintenance, staff training, and accounting. The full demilitarization cycle is shown schematically in Annexe 2.

It inevitably takes time to develop a safe, effective, and efficient industrial demilitarization capability within a state that also reflects the safety and environmental concerns of donors, but this should not prevent the initial steps being taken to support the development of such facilities. In many regions this sort of capacity must be developed from the semi-dormant and under-resourced state ammunition production facilities, which requires infrastructure investment, staff training, and demilitarization equipment procurement. It is likely that the solution is a balance whereby OBOD should be used to destroy potentially unstable stocks in the short term while, at the same time, a facility is developed in those nations with large stockpiles. For those countries with insignificant stockpiles, OBOD will remain the only economically practical option.

A solution that is often proposed at international conferences is the development of a regional demilitarization facility. While this seems an attractive concept for donors and the recipient country, it raises a number of political and technical difficulties. The large stockpiles present in many countries in the region mean that national economies of scale could justify a national demilitarization capacity. Many states within the region would support a regional facility if it were in their own country, because it would represent a major economic investment and a potential source of income. They are however unlikely to commit funds for destruction at a regional facility 'next door'. Technically, the most efficient means of transporting ammunition and explosives is usually by rail. The effectiveness of the rail infrastructure and the distance ammunition is required to travel would therefore have a significant impact on the location of any regional demilitarization facility. Last, the international donor community is unlikely to have the resources to pay for destruction of the total surplus stockpile, which would become an economic issue between countries.

It is difficult to estimate the destruction costs for ammunition because there are so many factors to consider, including: (a) the type of ammunition; (b) economies of scale; © existing indigenous capacity and resources; (d) explosive and environmental legislation; (e) the training levels of local staff; (f the economic level of the host nation; (g) the fact that destruction projects often include weapons and ammunition at an overall fixed cost, as opposed to costs per ammunition type; and (h) donor priorities. This makes estimating the costs of an intervention to support the destruction of ammunition difficult when large stockpiles are involved, particularly when there is not an effective ammunition management system in place. Experience in Eastern Europe has indicated that assessments by properly qualified and experienced technical personnel are a valuable prerequisite for demilitarization planning. Donors must be prepared to fund the costs of these assessments. It is also important that donors recognize that the costs associated with structural development, technical training, and equipment procurement mean that while initial costs per tonne are high, subsequent destruction is a lot cheaper as the economies of scale take effect and national capacity is built. Table 2 sets out indicative costs but should not be considered authoritative for planning purposes.